One assessment of embodiment is the rubber hand illusion (RHI), a visuo-tactile illusion in which individuals attribute a sense of ownership to a rubber hand and disownership to their real hand. Interestingly, interoception seems to influence RHI susceptibility. In this study, we administered the RHI and the Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA) to examine embodiment experiences and interoceptive awareness in experienced meditators (n = 15) and non-meditators (n = 15). We found that meditators reported less intensity in rubber hand ownership, but there was no significant difference between groups with respect to disownership of their real hand or drift in finger proprioception. Moreover, we found, from our MAIA results, that disownership experiences were associated with a feeling of trusting one's body in nonmeditators and with the ability to maintain attention to unpleasant bodily sensations in meditators. These results suggest a unique relationship between interoceptive awareness and embodiment related to meditation.
Introduction
During mindfulness meditation (MM), individuals practice cultivating an awareness of their present moment experience, including the quality of bodily sensations, thoughts, emotional content and environmental inputs, with an attitude of non-judgment and acceptance (Desbordes et al., 2015; Kabat-Zinn, 2005) . One of the fundamental elements cultivated through MM is a more dynamic sense of embodiment, defined here as the perception of localized body-ownership in space (Lopez, Halje, & Blanke, 2008) . This relationship between mind and body is one of the most critical components of traditional Buddhist contemplative practices, as exemplified by the teachings put forward in the Maha-Saccaka Sutta: "if the body is not mastered [by meditation], the mind cannot be mastered. If the body is mastered, mind is mastered." (Thera, 2005, p. 118, chap. 5) .
So far, in line with the teachings in Maha-Saccaka Sutta, a number of studies have provided evidence that MM alters a practitioner's capacity to process bodily signals through shifts in sensory perception and the evaluation of afferent signals (Kerr et al., 2011; Kerr, Sacchet, Lazar, Moore, & Jones, 2013; Mirams, Poliakoff, Brown, & Lloyd, 2013) . For example, following an 8-week Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) intervention, which emphasizes sustained attention to bodily sensations, participants https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2018.09.003 Received 28 December 2017; Received in revised form 24 August 2018; Accepted 3 September 2018 exhibited enhanced local alpha (7-14 Hz) modulation in the finger representation areas of the primary somatosensory cortex in response to a tactile cue, suggesting enhanced neural modulation as a way to understand the behavioral effects of meditation. (Kerr et al., 2011) . Similarly, individuals who completed a week of brief body scan exercises showed significant increases in their success rate on a somatic signal detection task (Mirams et al., 2013) . This evidence for meditation-related improvements in somatic discrimination is mirrored by findings from Fox et al. (2012) that showed that expert meditators provided more accurate reporting of tactile sensitivity than novices and that this accuracy of interoceptive description was related to lifetime hours of meditation practice.
Lastly, MM experts demonstrate a higher pain threshold than non-meditators, a quality associated with the decoupling of brain regions implicated in emotional and cognitive appraisal and in areas involved in pain perception such as the anterior insula (Grant & Rainville, 2009; Grant, Courtemanche, & Rainville, 2011; Lutz, McFarlin, Perlman, Salomons, & Davidson, 2013) . Together, these findings suggest that MM practitioners may, through their training, cultivate embodiment experiences differently from non-meditators.
While these studies have examined tactile and sensory changes in embodiment experiences with MM practitioners, investigation of embodiment experiences related to bodily self-consciousness has been scarce. Bodily self-consciousness, i.e., the conscious experience of identifying with one's body, provides a starting point in understanding a key feature in embodiment: how multisensory (i.e., somatic, visual, auditory, vestibular, visceral, and motor) neural signals are integrated to bodily self (the perception of one's body is in space) (Aspell, Lenggenhager, & Blanke, 2012, chap. 24; Blanke, 2012) . So far, research has shown that, compared to controls, yoga practitioners rely more heavily on body centered signals (i.e., vestibular, proprioceptive, tactile, and visceral signals) as opposed to visual signals when judging the orientation of visually presented stimuli. Specifically, yoga practitioners were shown to be more accurate in assessing the verticality of a target stimulus (i.e., they were less likely to be influenced by misleading contextual visual information) .
One experimental paradigm providing a platform to investigate mechanisms of bodily self-consciousness by testing susceptibility to a proprioceptive embodiment illusion, is the so-called rubber hand illusion (RHI) (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) . In the RHI, a sense of ownership over a rubber hand is induced through the manipulation of multisensory integration of bodily information (Longo, Schüür, Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2008) . In the RHI, a rubber hand is placed near a participant's real hand while his or her real hand is hidden from view. An experimenter then strokes both the participant's real hand and the rubber hand in synchrony, inducing the sense that the rubber hand is the participant's actual hand. This artificial sense of ownership of the rubber hand may be due to the perceptual conflict between seeing a touch on the rubber hand while feeling the touch on the real hand that is hidden from sight (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) .
While the RHI is a robust multisensory illusion, there is wide variability in the strength of RHI susceptibility. Some clinical studies have linked greater RHI susceptibility to positive schizotypy traits (Germine, Benson, Cohen, & Hooker, 2013) and body dysmorphia (Kaplan, Enticott, Hohwy, Castle, & Rossell, 2014) , while others have linked lower RHI susceptibility to other clinical disorders such as autism (Paton, Hohwy, & Enticott, 2011) . Furthermore, studies examining the influence of contemplative practices on RHI have found decreased RHI susceptibility in expert Tai Chi practitioners (Kerr, Agrawal, & Nayak, 2016) but not in yoga practitioners .
One key factor that seems to play a role in these various experiences of RHI and body awareness is interoception, i.e., the sense of the body's internal condition, which includes the detection of afferent signals inside and outside the body. In particular, higher interoceptive sensitivity in a heartbeat detection task (i.e., more accurate detection of heart rate) correlates with less RHI susceptibility (Tsakiris, Jimenez, & Costantini, 2011) . Additionally, Suzuki, Garfinkel, Critchley, & Seth's (2013) study using the "cardiac rubber hand illusion," which combines RHI with cardiac-related feedback, provides evidence of a direct influence of the availability of interoceptive information on body ownership. This is consistent with Seth's (2013) framework positive interoception and predictive coding as a crucial component in the rubber hand illusion.
However, while the relationship between bodily self-consciousness and interoceptive accuracy has been investigated using RHI, the relationship between bodily self-consciousness and other dimensions of interoception such as interoceptive awareness is less well understood. Interoceptive awareness, defined as the subjective awareness of interoceptive signals, provides an in depth measure of body awareness (Garfinkel, Seth, Barrett, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2015) . Investigations of differences in interoceptive accuracy between meditators and controls using heartbeat detection tests have had mixed results (Khalsa et al., 2008) . However, meditators have been found to have greater levels of confidence in their subjective reports (Garfinkel et al., 2015; Khalsa et al., 2008) . The discrepancies between the meditators' interoceptive accuracy and interoceptive awareness suggest a need to examine different dimensions of interoception in more detail in order to better understand embodiment experiences in meditation. Furthermore, while research studies have documented interoceptive awareness and its relation to clinical efficacy of meditation in expert practitioners (Bornemann, Herbert, Mehling, & Singer, 2015; Farb & Mehling, 2016) , only little work has explored how interoceptive awareness may be related to proprioception (Cebolla et al., 2016) . Given the unique embodiment experiences in MM practitioners, as well as the reported differences in interoceptive awareness in meditators compared to controls, a secondary aspect of this study intends to explore how interoceptive awareness changes bodily self-consciousness in MM.
Thus, the purpose of the current study is to examine whether expert meditators differ from non-meditators in bodily self-consciousness as measured by RHI susceptibility and to examine whether potential differences in RHI susceptibility are related to differences in interoceptive awareness.
Material and methods

Participants
A group of 15 experienced MM practitioners (defined by at least 3 months of mindfulness training) with normal or corrected-tonormal vision participated in the study (mean age: 40.47, range: 19-62, 5 females). Meditators were recruited through a posting sent out to two meditation communities (Brown Meditation Community and Benevolent St. Sangha) as well as through paper postings throughout the local area. Meditators gave informed consent and were not compensated for their participation, as they had volunteered to be part of this experiment without payment. A group of 15 non-meditators (defined by no meditation experience or at most, less than 3 months, of meditation experience) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision were also recruited to participate in the study (mean age: 32.87, range: 20-60, 7 females). Non-meditators were recruited through Craigslist postings as well as through paper postings throughout the local area. Non-meditators gave informed consent and were compensated a $20 VISA gift card for their participation. The study protocol was approved by the Brown University Institutional Review Board. We screened interested participants for any neurological, psychiatric or medical illnesses that would interfere with the ability to participate in RHI (e.g., carpal tunnel syndrome).
Measures
RHI procedure
For the RHI, participants were seated in front of a two-compartment, open-ended box ( Fig. 1) . One compartment had a transparent cover while the other had an opaque cover. Participants placed their right arm in the opaque compartment, hidden from sight, while a lifelike rubber hand was placed in the transparent compartment, positioned such that it approximated the normal location of the participant's real right arm. A cape was placed around the participants to cover the ends of their arms and the end of the rubber hand.
The experiment consisted of 2 trials total: one synchronous condition and one asynchronous condition. For the synchronous condition, the experimenter used a paint brush to stroke, for two minutes, either the participant's covered right index finger, middle finger, ring finger or pinky and the corresponding finger on the visible rubber hand synchronously. For the asynchronous condition, the experimenter also stroked the rubber hand and the subject's real hand, except rather than stroking the hands at the same time, the strokes alternated with one stroke on the real hand and no stroke on the rubber hand and then one stroke on the corresponding finger on the rubber hand with no stroke on the real hand. All strokes were done in a random manner, with strokes extending from different knuckles on the finger to the tip of the finger. The strokes also varied in their speed and were timed using a metronome that only the experimenter heard through headphones. The subjects were instructed to fixate their eyes and pay attention to the rubber hand being stroked by the paintbrush throughout the course of the experiment (see Fig. 1 for display of experiment). Trial order was counterbalanced across participants.
RHI: proprioceptive drift
Prior to RHI induction, the experimenter used a yard stick to ask participants to verbally report at which inch mark the participants perceived their right index finger to be. Three measurements of participants' perceived locations of their right index finger were recorded in this manner. The yard stick was positioned differently for all three measurements to prevent participants from using certain inch marks as anchors for their response. The average of the three measurement recordings was used as a location of where participants perceived their right index prior to the induction of the rubber hand illusion. Another recording of participants' perceived location of their right index finger was conducted after RHI induction. Proprioceptive drift was calculated as the difference between the measure before and after RHI.
RHI: questionnaire
After each recording of where participants indicated where they perceived their right index finger to be, the experimenter asked the participants to provide a verbal rating, on a 7-point Likert scale, how much they agreed with statements assessing their subjective experience of RHI. These statements were used from Kállai et al. (2015) to assess two major components of the rubber hand illusion experience: ownership of the rubber hand and disownership of participants' real hands. Ownership and disownership scores were calculated by summing all responses in each respective category and then dividing the sum by the number of questions. A high score in the ownership category indicated increased ownership experience of the rubber hand, while a high score in the disownership category indicated increased disownership of participants' real hands. Another statement ("It seemed as if I might have more than left hand or arm") was used as a manipulation check to control for response bias.
Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA)
Participants were administered the MAIA (Mehling et al. (2012) ) in order to evaluate whether RHI susceptibility was related to self-reported interoceptive awareness. The MAIA consists of eight subscales focusing on different factors of interoceptive awareness which can be evaluated independently, including: (1) "noticing" (awareness of body sensations); (2) "not-distracting" (tendency not to ignore sensations of pain or discomfort); (3) "not-worrying" (tendency not to worry or emotionally distress over sensations of pain or discomfort); (4) "attention regulation" (ability to sustain and control attention to body sensations); (5) "emotional awareness" (awareness of the connection between bodily sensations and emotional states); (6) "self-regulation" (ability to regulate distress by attention to body sensations); (7) "body listening" (active listening to the body for insight); and (8) "trusting" (experience of one's body as safe and trustworthy).
Each subscale contains statements related to unique dimensions of interoceptive awareness (e.g. "I notice when I am uncomfortable in my body"). Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they relate to each item using a 6-point scale (with 0 = "never" and 5 = "always"). The score for each factor was obtained by summing all responses for each factor (and reverse-scoring statements that were the opposite of each factor) and then dividing each sum by the number of questions (Mehling et al. (2012) ).
Statistical analysis
The behavioral data were analyzed using the statistics software SPSS 22. Graphs displayed were created using R version 1.0.153 with the ggplot2 package (Wickham, 2016) , the Hmisc package (Harrell, 2017) , and functions from R Cookbook (Teetor, 2011) . Results with p < 0.05 were considered statistically significant in our analyses. First, normality of RHI scores were assessed using a ShapiroWilk test. Because the results showed non-normality in ownership scores in both conditions (W(29) = 0.827, p < .001 for synchronous; W(29) = 0.908, p = .016 for asynchronous) and normality in disownership scores in the synchronous condition only (W (29) = 0.836, p = .000 for asynchronous; W(29) = 0.94, p = .102 for synchronous), a Wilcoxon-Rank test was conducted to assess differences in disownership and ownership scores between synchronous and asynchronous conditions (see Fig. 2 for histogram of RHI scores). Next, to ensure that participants used the scale accurately, a Wilcoxon-Rank test was conducted to check if disownership scores and ownership scores were significantly different from control statement scores. Finally, a Mann-Whitney test was conducted to assess between-group differences in RHI susceptibility across both conditions.
To investigate proprioceptive drift, a paired samples t-test was first conducted to determine whether both groups exhibited proprioceptive drift in the synchronous condition and/or the asynchronous condition post-RHI induction. Next, an independent sample t-test was conducted to determine whether non-meditators experienced proprioceptive drift more strongly than meditators.
To assess differences between meditators and non-meditators in their scores for each factor in MAIA, normality was first assessed using a Shapiro-Wilk Test. Because some of the factors were found to not be normally distributed, we used a Mann-Whitney test to measure between-group differences in scores for each factor in MAIA. Effect sizes for Mann-Whitney tests were computed using the method outlined in Fritz, Morris, and Richter (2012) . To examine the relationship between MAIA factors and RHI ownership and disownership scores, we calculated Spearman's rho correlations to determine whether each of the factors used in MAIA were correlated with RHI ownership and disownership scores separately. We ran these correlation tests on three different samples to examine differences in the relationship between MAIA and RHI in meditators and non-meditators: the whole sample (i.e., meditators and nonmeditators; N = 30), meditators only (n = 15), and non-meditators only (n = 15).
Results
Rubber hand illusion: proprioceptive drift and RHI questionnaire
Within-subject differences were first analyzed between the synchronous and asynchronous conditions (see Fig. 3 for descriptive statistics of mean and standard error). Wilcoxon-rank tests revealed significant differences in ownership scores between the synchronous and asynchronous conditions, with higher scores in the synchronous condition (Z = −4.376; p < .001) but not disownership scores between the synchronous and asynchronous conditions (Z = −3.591, p < .001). No significant differences between synchronous and asynchronous control items were detected, suggesting that participants used the rating scale accurately (Z = −1.456 for control asynchronous − control synchronous, 2-tailed p = .145).
While results did not survive Bonferroni corrections for nonparametric analyses, we nevertheless report the statistically significant results shown as well as their effect sizes. Mann-Whitney tests revealed that ownership scores were greater for non-meditators (Mdn = 6.5) compared to meditators (Mdn = 4.5) in the synchronous condition (U = 56.5, p = 0.019, r = 0.35), but there was no significant difference between the groups in the asynchronous condition (non-meditators Mdn = 2.5; meditators Mdn = 2.5; U = 96, p = 0.512). Furthermore, non-meditators (Mdn = 4.33) had greater disownership scores than meditators (Mdn = 3.0) though this only reached marginal significance (U = 91.0, p = 0.05). In the asynchronous condition, non-meditators had greater disownership scores (Mdn = 2.0) compared to meditators (Mdn = 1.67) though this did not reach statistical significance (U = 91; p = .389, r = 0.43). There were no significant differences in meditators vs. non-meditators in use of the control statement for the synchronous condition (meditators Mdn = 2; non-meditators Mdn = 3; U = 78; p = .161) or asynchronous condition (meditators Mdn = 1; nonmeditators Mdn = 1; U = 91; p = .389).
A paired-samples t-test revealed significant differences in proprioceptive perception between pre-RHI induction and post-RHI induction in the synchronous condition (t(29) = 2.09, p = .045) but not the asynchronous condition (t(29) = 0.686, p = .498), indicating that participants experienced the proprioceptive drift aspect of RHI strongly in the synchronous condition. However, an independent-samples t-test revealed no significant differences in proprioceptive drift between meditators and non-meditators in the synchronous condition (t(28) = 0.661, p = .514) and in the asynchronous condition (t(28) = −0.187, p = .853).
Interoceptive awareness
Mann-Whitney tests revealed no significant differences in MAIA scores between meditators and non-meditators in any of the factors. Spearman's rho was next used to test for correlations between the MAIA factors and RHI ownership and disownership scores in the synchronous and asynchronous conditions. Of the eight subscales, we were unable to find any significant correlations between any of the MAIA factors and RHI scores when using the whole meditators and non-meditators sample. However, in the meditatorsonly sample, we found a significant negative correlation between MAIA "not distracting" scores and RHI disownership scores in the synchronous condition (r s (13) = −0.661, p = .007), though there was no significant correlation between MAIA "not distracting" and RHI ownership scores in the synchronous condition (r s (13) = −0.280, p = .313). In the non-meditators sample, we did not find a significant relationship between MAIA "not distracting" and any of the RHI scores in the synchronous condition (disownership: r s (13) = −0.383, p = 0.159; ownership: r s (13) = −0.233, p = .404). However, we found a significant correlation between MAIA "trust" and RHI disownership scores in the synchronous condition (r s (13) = −0.536, p = .039) but not ownership (r s (13) = −0.241, p = .386). This relationship was not found in meditators (disownership: r s (13) = −0.02, p = 0.93; ownership: r s (13) = −0.038, p = .843) (see Fig. 4 for scatter plot of results).
Discussion
Our experiment aimed to compare meditators' and non-meditators' susceptibility to the RHI, as well as the relationship between RHI susceptibility and interoceptive awareness, in order to better understand embodiment experiences in MM practitioners. Our results showed that, overall, meditators reported less strong ownership of the rubber hand and disownership of their real hand, but we were unable to find differences in proprioceptive drift between meditators and non-meditators. In addition, we analyzed correlations between RHI scores and different dimensions of the MAIA. We found a significant relationship between the MAIA "not distracting" subscale (i.e., not being distracting by intense bodily sensations) and RHI disownership in meditators but not in nonmeditators. In contrast, RHI disownership was related to a general feeling of trusting one's body in non-meditators but not in meditators. When combining the meditators and non-meditators group into a single group, there were no significant correlations between MAIA scores and RHI scores. We report exploratory findings suggesting that meditative training may facilitate a different subjective reporting of bodily processing that can be characterized by the use of interoceptive awareness.
First, the finding that meditators reported lower subjective RHI ownership ratings compared to non-meditators while there was no significant difference in proprioceptive drift between the two groups suggests that meditators may still show similar susceptibility to the illusion, but their subjective experience of it is different. To our knowledge, so far only Cebolla et al.'s (2016) study has used the RHI and an assessment of interoceptive awareness in mindfulness meditators to examine bodily self-consciousness. Their study found a significant difference in RHI scale ratings in only agency of the rubber hand but not in ownership of the rubber hand itself. However, their study did not include an asynchronous condition, so how necessary tactile synchrony during induction of the RHI was in shifting experiences of bodily sensations was unclear. Our study corroborates the findings of Cebolla et al.'s (2016) in that we also found a difference in RHI subjective reporting in expert MM practitioners, but we extend their study by including an asynchronous condition, which allows us to examine whether RHI susceptibility requires tactile input or is merely due to visual input dominance of the rubber hand (Botvinick, 2004) . Differences between the synchronous and asynchronous condition in our study suggests that the RHI results observed could not have been due to just dominance of visual information but rather, requires tactile input. Furthermore, we were also able to detect differences in subjective experience of owning the rubber hand while Cebolla et al.'s (2016) study did not. The discrepancies between our findings and the findings in Cebolla et al.'s (2016) study suggest that clarifying how MM affects RHI susceptibility warrants further study. Additionally, our findings related to our proprioceptive drift measure compared to our findings related to our RHI scale measure may suggest distinct dimensions of the RHI experience characterized by differences between what is revealed by the subjective reporting of RHI (i.e., how intense the illusion is rated for those experiencing it measured by the RHI scale) versus what is revealed by the objective measure of the illusion (i.e., how it affects multisensory integration measured by proprioceptive drift). Indeed, a number of recent studies corroborate the distinction between the two measures. For example, Rohde, Luca, and Ernst (2011) suggests that proprioceptive drift may be measuring differences in visual perception of the hand during induction of the RHI rather than the subjective experience of RHI. Similarly, Holle, McLatchie, Maurer, and Ward (2011) found that proprioceptive drift could occur in the absence of ownership of the rubber hand, suggesting that proprioceptive drift or RHI scale scores, by themselves, do not tell the whole story. Though distinguishing proprioceptive drift and RHI susceptibility is outside the scope of this paper, this study suggests that future studies should attempt to dissociate the two measures to better understand the RHI experience.
One potential explanation of how RHI subjective reporting may be changed with meditative training is related to the Buddhist notion of equanimity, defined by Desbordes et al. (2015) as an "even-minded mental state or dispositional tendency toward all experiences or objects, regardless of their origin or their affective valence." While Desbordes et al. (2015) defines equanimity in terms of an even-minded state related to affective valence, our findings suggest that equanimity can also extend to abnormal, low-level bodily sensations such as in RHI. Differences between subjective ratings in RHI scale between meditators and non-meditators in the absence of differences in proprioceptive drift suggest that while meditators may be susceptible to bodily illusions, meditators interpret and appraise their experiences differently from non-meditators. The effect of meditative training on cultivating a sense of equanimity may help in clarifying how meditation can change embodiment experiences related to RHI.
Corroborating our interpretation of equanimity as a form of meditative training that changes reportings of abnormal bodily sensations, we found that while none of the factors of interoceptive awareness from MAIA were associated with RHI scale scores at the whole group level, different dimensions of interoceptive awareness negatively correlated with RHI scale scores in expert meditators and non-meditators. While RHI susceptibility in meditators was uniquely related to not being distracted by difficult bodily sensations, RHI susceptibility in non-meditators was related to an overall general trust of one's own body. These findings add to our framework of equanimity as a way to understand RHI experiences in meditators by providing evidence to suggest that following meditative training, there is a change, not in the raw sensation of an experience, but rather in the propensity to experience the raw sensation regardless of intensity (Kabat-Zinn, 2005) . The expert MM practitioners in our study may have honed their ability to experience the RHI without reporting as much intensity in the abnormal bodily experience as non-meditators in their MM practice, as indicated by the unique relationship between the ability to not be distracted by bodily sensations and RHI scores present in our meditators sample. Follow-up studies looking deeper into equanimity and MM can help elucidate this potential relationship.
It is worth noting, however, that in contrast to previous studies reporting greater interoceptive awareness in meditators (Bornemann et al., 2015) , we did not find any significant differences between meditators and non-meditators in their MAIA ratings. Such contrasting findings warrants the need to find better objective measures in interoceptive awareness that may clarify these discrepancies. Nevertheless, our correlational results demonstrate distinct dimensions in interoceptive awareness that are associated with rubber hand illusion susceptibility in meditators and non-meditators.
A possible explanation for our results may be that meditators have superior attentional resources in general. Specifically, previous findings have demonstrated increased sensory discrimination associated with meditative experience (Kerr et al., 2011 (Kerr et al., , 2013 . However, while more accurate somatic sensory filtering observed in mind-body practitioners (e.g., Tai Chi, yoga, etc.) was shown to be related to less susceptibility to the RHI in an expert Tai Chi practitioner sample (Kerr et al., 2016) , levels of body awareness in yoga practitioners were not found to be related to RHI susceptibility . Thus, attentional resources in mind-body practitioners, who have some element of focusing on bodily sensations, are unlikely to be the only factor to account for the findings. Furthermore, while attentional resources can be assumed to partly contribute to the differences observed in our RHI results, this does not contradict our interpretation of the results centered around equanimity. Our interpretation suggests that meditators can more flexibly shift their attention so that that they are less influenced by "abnormal" bodily sensations such as those triggered by the RHI. This interpretation is corroborated by our distinct correlational findings between MAIA and RHI.
Finally, while our study was able to distinguish expert meditators and non-meditators in reporting of RHI susceptibility, we were only able to use cross-sectional data to find associations between meditative training and bodily self-consciousness. Future studies should attempt to better parse out the framework for bodily self-consciousness in meditators that we have begun to explore in this paper to more clearly understand the mechanisms behind psychological changes following meditative training. One such extension may be using longitudinal data to more rigorously explore whether meditative training causally influences bodily self-consciousness. Furthermore, while we only used one trial per condition to not anchor scale ratings, more trials in the future would be better in examining whether our proprioceptive drift results would still hold. Nevertheless, our study provides a starting point in better understanding how meditative training may change bodily self-processing through engendering equanimity, and our study warrants further exploration in distinguishing phenomenological aspects of RHI.
Conclusions
Few studies have looked into bodily self-consciousness components of embodiment in MM. The results from this study suggest differences in the reporting of RHI intensity in MM practitioners compared to non-practitioners but not in proprioceptive drift from the induction of RHI. Furthermore, these differences were associated with different factors of interoceptive awareness in MM practitioners versus non-practitioners. These findings suggest different reports in embodiment experiences associated with different factors of interoceptive awareness in MM.
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